A newly proposed law in China threatens to further entrench the government’s repressive policies against ethnic minorities, according to a report released by Human Rights Watch. The draft Law on Promoting Ethnic Unity and Progress, submitted to the National People’s Congress on September 8, 2025, is seen as a legal mechanism that would justify existing discriminatory practices while intensifying ideological control over diverse populations both within and outside China.
This sweeping 62-article draft law is framed as an initiative to promote what the Chinese government calls “common prosperity and development” among all ethnic groups, under the guidance of General Secretary Xi Jinping’s vision for ethnic affairs. However, critics argue that the law is less about unity and more about enforcing conformity to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) ideology at the expense of human rights.
Maya Wang, associate Asia director at Human Rights Watch, stated, “The Chinese government’s draft law on promoting ethnic unity seeks to mobilize the bureaucracy and society to unite people under Chinese Communist Party leadership at the expense of human rights.” Wang’s comments underscore concerns that Tibetans, Uyghurs, and other ethnic minorities who advocate for their rights will face increased repression under the proposed law.
The draft law’s preamble asserts a historical narrative that positions the modern People’s Republic of China as a unified multi-ethnic nation, a concept that Xi Jinping has increasingly emphasized in his policies. The law seeks to instill a “common consciousness of the Chinese nation” across various sectors, including education, religion, and mass media. For instance, Article 14 explicitly demands that authorities establish Chinese cultural symbols in public spaces, thereby promoting a homogenized cultural identity that sidelines minority traditions.
The implications of this ideological framework extend into urban planning and economic policy. Article 23 mandates that housing policies foster “ethnic unity,” while Article 34 links security measures to this same ideology. Notably, Article 40 seeks to redefine personal relationships by promoting a singular view of marriage that disregards ethnic or religious distinctions.
In a troubling expansion of state control, Article 12 mobilizes the entire state apparatus to educate citizens in alignment with CCP ideology, mandating that parents instill love for the party in their children. This is a dramatic shift from the traditional responsibilities of the CCP’s United Front Work Department, which has historically managed ethnic affairs. Article 44 further extends this effort by calling on enterprises and public institutions to promote party ideology, effectively coercing compliance across all sectors of society.
The draft law also establishes vague prohibitions against actions that “damage ethnic unity,” a term historically exploited by the government to suppress dissent among minority communities. For instance, in Tibet, advocating for language rights or voicing concerns about government policies has frequently been branded as a threat to unity, resulting in imprisonment for those who speak out.
In Xinjiang, the state has justified its widespread repression of the Uyghur population using rhetoric similar to that found in the draft law. Allegations of “cultural persecution” and other violations against Uyghurs have already been framed as challenges to ethnic unity, with the government categorizing even peaceful activities, such as studying the Quran, as “ideological viruses.”
One of the most alarming aspects of the draft law is its apparent intention to erode the previously guaranteed rights of minorities to use and develop their own languages—rights established by the 1984 Law on Regional National Autonomy. Instead, the new law emphasizes the dominance of Mandarin Chinese. For instance, while the 1984 law allows for the use of local languages in government documents, the draft law stipulates that any such documents must also feature a version in Mandarin, clearly prioritizing the latter.
The draft law also mandates that minority students begin learning Mandarin from preschool, culminating in a requirement that they master the language by the end of their compulsory education. This shift aims to diminish the use of minority languages in education, a trend already evident in regions such as Tibet, Xinjiang, and Inner Mongolia, where access to education in native languages has been severely curtailed despite community protests.
Moreover, the draft law has international implications, as it seeks to extend its ideological reach beyond China’s borders. Article 17 calls for the propagation of CCP ideology through academic exchanges and partnerships with civil society groups, particularly targeting Taiwanese and overseas Chinese communities. In a stark warning, Article 61 asserts that entities outside China that “undermine national unity” will face legal consequences.
The Chinese government has previously exerted pressure on foreign institutions to conform to its narrative, including insisting that Tibet be referred to by its Mandarin name, Xizang. Instances of transnational repression have also been reported, where individuals studying abroad or members of the diaspora face intimidation for expressing dissenting opinions about China. Recently, a Chinese student was arrested for advocating for Tibetan rights while studying overseas, illustrating the lengths to which the government will go to stifle free expression.
“The draft law on ethnic unity is a blatant effort by the Chinese government to control people’s thoughts and expression about China both inside and outside the country,” Wang concluded. “Concerned countries should push back against these efforts by pressing the Chinese government to scrap the law and stop persecuting ethnic minority communities and their supporters.”
