By Theodoros Apostolos Koutsoumpas
As 2024 completes its circle around the Sun, I cannot help but note it was a year full of conflicts: the Russian invasion of Ukraine persisted, Israel escalated dramatically its operations against the Palestinians, the Hezbollah and Iran whereas in Syria, Assad’s regime collapsed after half a century of political dominance. As these examples point out, war (or violent conflict, since according to the UN Charter war is forbidden) is not only still relevant but it occurs, if not more often, at least more easily than we were accustomed to after the end of the Cold War. So, an initial question popping out of this is a simple “why?”.
Trying to answer this question is of course an ambitious and challenging venture. Not to mention it can be addressed by using many different routes. As a start though, one could try to broaden the definition of war [direct, somatic violence between state actors (Evans & Newnham, 1998)] by highlighting the element of violence. In modern warfare, taking full-scale military action is not usually the case. In contrast, states are more prone to escalate from lower levels of violent action to reach (if they decide so) full military engagement. What is more, war, both in these early stages and during the conflict, can be waged via a great variety of means (cyber warfare, psychological warfare, asymmetric warfare etc.). This array of methods has been termed “hybrid warfare” meaning essentially the many options an actor has to harm its opponent(s) both in low level (e.g. election fraud, fake news, cyber attacks) and in high level conflict (e.g. high-tech or more conventional military operations) (Weissmann, et al., 2021).
So, given that war is more complex than it used to be, one could try to find out if war occurs more often today than the not-so-long past. However, the answer to such a question cannot be the purpose of an article. Nevertheless, I will employ psychological theories in order to formulate certain hypotheses which could lead to sufficient results if tested and examined properly. In my view, psychology (political, social, cognitive, personality psychology etc) by its diverse and deep study of human nature can provide meaningful insights in the search for answers to questions like this, in addition to more mainstream approaches.
H1: Significantly lower possibility of casualties and material damages leads to more risk acceptability
Modern war, as it is described above, can be better understood as a continuum of violence. It is plausible for one to assume that in its early stages, a state actor can impose considerable damage to the opponent with significantly lower casualties and material damages for itself. Causing political instability by fake news, bribing and election frauds along with trade war and economically hostile measures are typical examples of this approach.
From a psychological point of view one could find relevant theories in those describing the adversary through the image of opportunity, where a country is instrumentalized in order to fulfill another country’s needs (Gruenfeld, et al., 2008; Fitzsimons & Shah, 2008). Of course, depending on the case, theories about the “enemy image” (Cottam, 1994; Reeder, et al., 2005) which excuse, among others, inhumane acts (Castano & Giner-Sorolla, 2006) may also come into play.
Another strand of psychological theories arguing in favor of this hypothesis engulfs those referring to certain emotion or emotional states. As the options of violent actions are plenty, stress may not be paralyzing in leaders but create a “challenge mode” in which they think they possess all the resources needed to handle a particular situation (Kemeny, 2003). Aligned to this, theories about the mood point out that when someone does not feel overwhelmed by a situation may be more daring and think outside of the box (Gasper & Clore, 2002).
H2: Wide range of violent options makes war/violence more attractive
As stated before, the many options for violent action can play a critical role in whether a state/leader will resort to war. By creating a multi-level and multi-factored spectrum in warfare, modern actors can truly exploit the political opportunities offered by war with an increased sense of escalation dominance and with a substantially diminished fear that they could be mingled in a full-scale military conflict.
The aforementioned theories about images and emotions may also be useful in treating this hypothesis. One could add to the analytic framework prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) as well. Regardless of the feeling that they are or not in the “domain of loss” (a situation where the actor possesses less than what they think they deserve or are willing to accept) which speaks in favor of a risk acceptant mentality, even in the “domain of gain”, the actor may be relatively more prone to risk violent actions in the presence of an important variety of methods and,
consequently, the absence of many destructive consequences in modern warfare. Of course, prospect theory can also be applied to H1.
H3: More agents at play make modern war more difficult and thus less attractive
One of the consequences of the broadening of modern warfare is the increase in its complexity. In order to coordinate actions in various levels a leader will need competent and highly skillful personnel. It goes without saying though that very often, this is not enough. It is almost certainly impossible to control a large state bureaucratic apparatus, let alone knowing how each person will react to particular situations in response to their individual motives and dispositions.
A psychological theory clearly about decision-making under crisis is Janis’s idea of groupthink, where the group cohesion becomes more important for its members than the careful examination of a situation (Janis, 1972). Moreover, the concept of cognitive complexity (Suedfeld, 2010; Hermann, 2003) may be well-suited to describe why some leaders are more willing to accept pluralism of different opinions in decision-making whereas others are not
H4: Easier resort to violence creates greater instability and leads to more distrust
Due to the many options an actor has to use violence in modern war environment, it should not come as a surprise that the greater access to these practices contribute to maximizing instability between the states and preserving a climate of distrust where diplomacy is even more difficult to succeed. From a psychological point of view, this hypothesis can be approached by many theories. The concepts of enemy images and escalation spirals that are prominent among cognitive approaches may be in use here as well (Jervis, 2017; 1976). Additionally, theories about political behavior in post-traumatic societies (Canetti, et al., 2017) as well as treatises of the emotions of humiliation (Fattah & Fierke, 2009) and pride (Hymans, 2006) may also offer substantial insights in examining the validity of this idea.
H5: Economic costs are relevant more than ever in modern warfare and lead to more restrained approach to violence
Although nowadays actors can select among methods with no significant human toll or material damages, whatever their sets of actions, the latter cost a lot of money and resources. Even funding disinformation campaigns and cyber attacks is an extremely costly endeavor, not to mention things as political assassinations, weaponization of migration flows and economic warfare. War, essentially violence, is an expensive affair even in lower levels of engagement, and the possibility of losing millions in damages to cutting-edge technology weapons and infrastructure should be a serious deterring factor.
Employing psychology here we could again resort to prospect theory and claim that, those high expenses given, an actor may be possible to start a war only if they believed their position was seriously undermined by the current status quo. Interestingly, in the search of what economic sacrifices could be imposed, theories about public opinion and political legitimacy (Kertzer, et al., 2014; Rathbun, et al., 2016), group-based emotions (Mercer, 2014) and images are relevant in this case too. Lastly, personality theories implying a daring, megalomaniac or insecure leader personality (Saunders, 2011; Post, 2003) may also prove quite useful.
H6: Absence of conventional binding rules regulating recent technological developments or certain cases of violent interference makes war more tempting
Accepting or not that international law has a critical role in the function of international system, one should acknowledge that it creates a certain amount of predictability by the processes it imposes while its provisions are often dealt with as useful pretexts to impose a state a particular policy direction. But in the absence of these binding provisions, would the states be more tempting to risk violent actions? Exploring this hypothesis, one could find applicable for one more time prospect theory, as it is obvious that a subjective balance of costs and benefits is required to direct the risk-taking. Mutually to the above, the personality of the leader could have a considerable influence as well, so the relevant theories may have an important role to play.
As a conclusion, two things should be kept in mind. Firstly, the aforementioned hypotheses are by no means exclusive, nor are the psychological theories proposed to treat them. One can approach such a demanding subject by a plethora of alleys. Secondly, as war is happening for thousands years in different cultures and places, it is important not to dress it with the cloak of monism. This means not to impose a set of universal motives and behaviors in resorting to and waging war. Of course, discovering behavioral patterns offers us greater explanatory power of social phenomena. But, instead of looking at the forest, it is useful, from time to time, to look at the tree as well. I think that using psychology this way, much can be achieved in the study of International Relations.
References
Canetti, D., et al., 2017. Collective Trauma From the Lab to the Real World: The Effects of the Holocaust on Contemporary Israeli Political Cognitions. Political Psychology, 39(1), pp. 3-21.
Castano, E. & Giner-Sorolla, R., 2006. Not Quite Human: Infrahumanization in Response to Collective Responsibility for Intergroup Killing. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 90(5), p. 804–818.
Cottam, M. L., 1994. Images and Intervention: US Policies in Latin America. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.
Evans, G. & Newnham, J., 1998. The Penguin Dictionary of International Relations. London: Penguin Books.
Fattah, K. & Fierke, K. M., 2009. A Clash of Emotions: The Politics of Humiliation and Political Violence in the Middle East. European Journal of International Relations, 15(1), p. 67–93.
Fitzsimons, G. M. & Shah, J. Y., 2008. How Goal Instrumentality Shapes Relationship Evaluations. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 95(2), pp. 319 –337.
Gasper, K. & Clore, G. L., 2002. Attending to the Big Picture: Mood and Global Versus Local Processing of Visual Information. Psychological Science, 13(1), pp. 34-40.
Gruenfeld, D. H., Inesi, M. E., Magee, J. C. & Galinsky, A. D., 2008. Power and the Objectification of Social Targets. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 95(1), p. 111–127.
Hermann, M. G., 2003. Assessing leadership style: Trait analysis. Στο: The psychological assessment of political leaders: With profiles of Saddam Hussein and Bill Clinton. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, pp. 178-212.
Hymans, J. E., 2006. The Psychology of Nuclear Proliferation. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Janis, I. L., 1972. Victims of Groupthink. Boston: Houghton Miffiin Company.
Jervis, R., 1976. Perception and Misperception in International Politics. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
Jervis, R., 2017. How Statesmen Think: The Psychology of International Politics. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
Kahneman, D. & Tversky, A., 1979. Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk. Econometrica, 47(2), pp. 263-291.
Kemeny, M. E., 2003. The Psychobiology of Stress. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 12(4), pp. 124-129.
Kertzer, J. D., Powers, K. E., Rathbun, B. C. & Iyer, R., 2014. Moral Support: How Moral Values Shape Foreign Policy Attitudes. The Journal of Politics, 76(3), pp. 825-840.
Mercer, J., 2014. Feeling like a state: social emotion and identity. International Theory, 6(3), pp. 515-535.
Post, J. M., 2003. The Psychological Assessment of Political Leaders. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
Rathbun, B. C., et al., 2016. Taking Foreign Policy Personally: Personal Values and Foreign Policy Attitudes. International Studies Quarterly, 60(1), p. 124–137.
Reeder, G., Pryor, J., Wohl, M. & Grisswell, M., 2005. On Attributing Negative Motives to Others Who Disagree With Our Opinions. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 31(11), pp. 1498-1510.
Saunders, E. N., 2011. Leaders at War: How Presidents Shape Military Interventions. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press.
Suedfeld, P., 2010. The Cognitive Processing of Politics and Politicians: Archival Studies of Conceptual and Integrative Complexity. Journal of Personality, 78(6), pp. 1669-1702.
Weissmann, M., Nilsson, N., Palmertz, B. & Thunholm, P., 2021. Hybrid Warfare. Security and Asymmetric Conflict in International Relations. London: I. B. TAURIS.
