On August 28, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom activated the U.N. snapback mechanism, reinstating pre-2015 sanctions against Iran. Despite attempts by Russia and China to delay this process, their proposal was decisively rejected by a majority in the U.N. Security Council. With these sanctions now in place, Iran is once again besieged by severe restrictions: arms sales are curtailed, ballistic missile activities are banned, asset freezes are reinstated, and travel bans are enforced. The question that looms large for policymakers in Washington, Brussels, and Jerusalem is how Iran will respond to this renewed isolation.
The initial indicators of Tehran’s response are becoming evident. Shortly after the sanctions took effect, the Guardian Council approved new legislation that intensifies penalties for espionage and collaboration with “hostile states” like Israel while also imposing restrictions on civilian drone usage. Concurrently, the Fatehin special unit of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) conducted ostentatious drills in Tehran, flaunting new gear and military readiness. In an unexpected turn, the Expediency Council conditionally approved Iran’s accession to the Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, a significant move aimed at countering Western narratives that depict Iran as a state sponsor of terrorism.
These actions are far from ordinary; they represent a strategic pivot by the Islamic Republic designed to weather the renewed sanctions by reinforcing internal security, projecting an image of resilience to the global community, and signaling that these punitive measures will not shatter the regime. This approach suggests a preference for patience over provocation.
While Tehran attempted to delay the snapback, officials had long been aware of its impending arrival. Domestically, the regime attempts to downplay its impact, asserting that the Iranian economy is resilient enough to withstand these pressures. State-controlled media, linked to the IRGC, frame the sanctions not as a critical threat but as a psychological operation aimed at destabilizing public confidence and inciting political discord. This narrative fits neatly into a long-standing portrayal of sanctions as part of a broader regime-change strategy orchestrated by the West.
In the wake of the sanctions, Tehran has taken only modest steps: recalling ambassadors from several European nations, condemning the sanctions as illegitimate, and issuing vague threats regarding its cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). However, concrete escalations have yet to materialize.
Some factions within Tehran have called for more drastic measures, including the possibility of withdrawing from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). Such a move would liberate Iran from inspections and theoretically enable the pursuit of nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and senior officials have consistently rejected this option, recognizing that such a withdrawal would likely provoke Israeli military strikes, invite U.S. intervention, and compel regional rivals like Saudi Arabia and Turkey to pursue their own nuclear arsenals. In this context, the risks of escalating tensions are perceived as far outweighing any potential benefits.
Tehran is acutely aware of its constrained capabilities and the limited avenues for escalation. Most of its proxy forces have significantly weakened since the onset of the conflict on October 7, 2023, and the disintegration of the Assad regime has further diminished Iran’s regional influence. Only a few groups, such as the Houthis in Yemen and some Shiite militias in Iraq, retain the capacity to threaten U.S. and Israeli interests, though their operational reach is severely limited. While Iran could theoretically resort to cyberattacks or disrupt shipping routes in the Persian Gulf, such actions carry considerable risks, especially given Israel’s demonstrated willingness to strike within Iran’s borders and the U.S. commitment to retaliate against attacks on its personnel.
The burden of any potential escalation weighs heavily on Iranian decision-makers, who vividly recall the devastating consequences of previous conflicts with Israel, which severely crippled Iran’s nuclear and missile programs. Consequently, Tehran is more likely to downplay the impact of snapback sanctions while resorting to incremental tactics that enhance its leverage without crossing into outright confrontation. This could include advancing enrichment processes, deploying more advanced centrifuges, and restricting IAEA access—all while avoiding actions that could legitimize foreign military intervention.
Sanctions, while onerous, are not an unprecedented challenge for the Islamic Republic. Over decades, Iran has adapted to survive under stringent economic warfare. Reliance on oil sales to China, an extensive network of smuggling routes, and a tightly controlled domestic economy provide sufficient resources for the regime’s survival. For a government that has navigated economic strife for nearly half a century, sanctions have become a grim but familiar aspect of its existence.
Politically, Iran is fractured. Hard-liners advocate for defiance, while pragmatists caution against reckless actions. Historically, when faced with existential threats, Khamenei has leaned towards restraint. During the Trump administration’s “maximum pressure” campaign, Iran endured sanctions without exiting the NPT or launching a full-scale military conflict. This pattern is likely to prevail in the current situation.
Precedent supports this calculated approach. Time after time, Tehran has opted to endure external pressure rather than engage in risky escalations that could jeopardize its regime. Iranian leaders are expected to choose restraint, a strategy they term “strategic patience.” Timing is also a factor; with Israeli parliamentary elections looming, Tehran may perceive an opportunity for a shift in political dynamics. Additionally, the hope for a Democratic victory in the 2028 U.S. presidential election looms large, potentially providing a more amenable diplomatic environment.
In this context, Iranian leaders believe they need only to withstand pressure for a maximum of three years, drawing on what they describe as “divine miraculous assistance.” Khamenei recognizes that the snapback sanctions represent not only a foreign policy crisis but also a domestic one. The gravest threats to his leadership stem not from external forces but from within—a fragmented elite and widespread public discontent, both of which intensify under pressure. His dual strategy aims to maintain unity among the ruling elite while managing social unrest through a blend of controlled concessions and increased repression against dissent.
Cohesion among the elite has always been a cornerstone of the regime’s survival. Divisions among Revolutionary Guard commanders, clerics, or political leaders risk emboldening adversaries and destabilizing the system. Khamenei’s strategy emphasizes unity, framing resistance as a revolutionary duty and a matter of national pride. To achieve this, he offers incentives to loyalists while employing violence to deter defections, thereby intertwining his fate with that of the regime’s elites.
Simultaneously, Khamenei seeks to quell public dissent. Sanctions have already driven food prices up and devalued the currency, exacerbating public dissatisfaction. To mitigate this unrest, the regime has adjusted its approach to morality policing, once a central ideological tenet. Reports indicate that law enforcement has been instructed to take a softer stance on enforcing the Islamic dress code to avoid inciting public outrage akin to the protests following Mahsa Amini’s tragic death.
However, the regime’s intensified repression risks igniting further protests or destabilizing the status quo. Leaders are acutely aware that renewed sanctions will exacerbate economic hardship, driving inflation and unemployment higher. The haunting memories of the 2019 fuel protests, during which security forces killed approximately 1,500 people within a week, remain a cautionary tale. To preempt a recurrence, the government has begun showcasing its strength: deploying IRGC units for street patrols, enhancing surveillance, criminalizing dissent as “espionage,” and implementing new security laws to legitimize harsher crackdowns.
This dual strategy—fostering unity at the top while intensifying repression below—is designed to buy time for the regime. Khamenei anticipates three challenging years ahead, yet his strategy is straightforward: if the regime can maintain stability and suppress dissent, it can withstand external pressures until the geopolitical landscape shifts favorably.
The snapback mechanism represents a significant diplomatic setback and deepens Iran’s economic woes. Yet Tehran is unlikely to respond with dramatic escalation. Instead, it will likely revert to its oldest survival tactic: patience. The Islamic Republic will fortify its domestic sphere, project military defiance, and await favorable political changes in the U.S.
For Khamenei, now frail but still firmly in control, restraint is not a sign of weakness but a necessity. He aspires to exit history as a symbol of steadfastness and anti-American resistance rather than as a defeated leader who capitulated to external pressures. The outside world may perceive Iran as cornered by sanctions, but within Tehran, unity, repression, and patience are viewed as sufficient to sustain the Islamic Republic through the storm. In their eyes, endurance itself emerges as a form of victory.
This article highlights the importance of Stance on Sanctions.
