It is not often that a U.S. president openly calls for the return of a military base from a former adversary, yet that is precisely what occurred last week when President Donald Trump announced that his administration is “trying to get” Bagram Airfield back from the Taliban. This unexpected declaration has sparked a mixture of surprise and skepticism, reigniting discussions about the United States’ unfinished business in Taliban-controlled Afghanistan.
Bagram Airfield, once the hub of U.S. military operations in Afghanistan, was abandoned during the chaotic withdrawal in 2021 and swiftly fell under Taliban control. Four years later, it has returned to the forefront of American foreign policy discourse, with Trump intensifying his demands. “We want it back and we want it back soon. Right away,” he stated emphatically on September 20.
Reports indicate that the White House is actively considering options to reestablish a U.S. presence at Bagram, citing both its strategic counterterrorism significance and its proximity to key Chinese nuclear facilities. Located about 40 miles north of Kabul, Bagram is fully equipped to support large aircraft, drones, surveillance platforms, special operations forces, and rapid-response missions. While its loss symbolized a retreat for the United States, regaining control of Bagram could serve as a bold reassertion of American influence in a volatile region.
Despite Trump’s calls, the Taliban swiftly dismissed the notion of returning Bagram. However, the internal dynamics of the group have become increasingly complex in recent years, characterized by growing dissatisfaction over the emir’s consolidation of power and his blending of clerical authority with executive decision-making. Coupled with economic desperation and the rising threat from the Islamic State-Khorasan (IS-K), these fractures could create opportunities for practical engagement. Given the Taliban’s fixation on survival and internal pressures, Trump’s proposal may not be as far-fetched as it initially appears. His administration could leverage these divisions through a combination of incentives, back-channel diplomacy, and regional pressure.
Trump’s September 20 message on Truth Social ominously warned, “If Afghanistan doesn’t give Bagram Airbase back to those that built it, the United States of America, BAD THINGS ARE GOING TO HAPPEN!!!” This stark threat signals a potential recalibration of U.S. policy in a region where American influence has significantly waned. Since the withdrawal, IS-K has expanded its operations, enabling the resurgence of terrorist safe havens and a notable decline in U.S. intelligence capabilities. Meanwhile, countries like China, Russia, and Iran have aggressively stepped in to fill the vacuum left by the U.S.
The rationale for returning to Bagram is underscored by pressing security needs. U.S. intelligence assessments caution that IS-K could restore its external operations capabilities within months if left unchecked. The current model of over-the-horizon counterterrorism, reliant on bases in the Gulf, falls short of providing the necessary on-the-ground visibility and proximity required for effective counterterrorism operations in Afghanistan.
The Biden administration now faces multiple pathways forward, each laden with risks and trade-offs. The challenge lies in structuring an agreement that delivers tangible benefits while avoiding open-ended military commitments. Trump’s transactional approach could provide a unique advantage in negotiating such a deal.
One feasible route would involve negotiating directly with the Taliban, either through a standalone agreement or as an extension of the existing U.S.-Taliban Doha framework. In exchange for access to Bagram, the U.S. could offer a package of economic assistance, counterterrorism cooperation, and gradual political normalization, including easing sanctions. The Taliban would likely seek international legitimacy, beginning with a seat at the United Nations, and would demand relief from financial and travel restrictions. A potentially lucrative opportunity could also arise from U.S. investment in lithium mining in Afghanistan, which could benefit both parties and integrate Afghanistan into global supply chains.
While hard-liners within the Taliban are expected to resist any compromise with the U.S., other factions may view such a deal as beneficial. The emir, however, is not untouchable, especially if he faces dissent from within his ranks. Direct dialogue with the emir remains largely untested, but the Taliban’s reality as a cash-strapped regime increasingly vulnerable to IS-K may provide leverage for negotiations.
An alternative strategy could involve third-party arrangements, outsourcing Bagram’s management to a Gulf intermediary like Qatar or the United Arab Emirates, a NATO ally like Turkey, or a Central Asian partner like Uzbekistan. These nations have established relationships with the Taliban and could facilitate U.S. access for intelligence and operations, while allowing the Taliban to frame their cooperation as engagement with fellow Muslim nations rather than the U.S.
For example, Qatar already maintains a U.S. interests section in its embassy in Afghanistan and has facilitated back-channel talks with the Taliban. Uzbekistan, sharing a border with Afghanistan, still houses U.S.-supplied military assets that the Taliban desires to recover, while facing threats from Uzbek jihadi groups that operate in Taliban-controlled areas. The UAE, managing several key airports in Afghanistan, has valuable insights into Taliban logistics and has engaged with Taliban leadership.
Such third-party arrangements could provide Washington with legal and diplomatic cover, minimizing the optics of direct engagement with the Taliban while allowing for a face-saving narrative for the regime. Even if the Taliban were to resist certain operations, a workable compromise could still preserve U.S. counterterrorism capabilities on the ground.
Should formal discussions falter, the U.S. could pursue a covert presence through intelligence networks, paramilitary units, or private contractors. This method could build on relationships with former Afghan strike units or regional intermediaries, similar to historical CIA operations. Though risky, this approach aligns with U.S. history of operating in hostile environments through deniable means.
Ultimately, the U.S. desire to regain Bagram is driven not only by counterterrorism needs but also by broader geopolitical considerations. China is expanding its presence in Afghanistan, seeking rare-earth minerals and pivotal infrastructure projects. Russia has recognized the Taliban government and is enhancing security ties, while Iran continues to exert influence across Afghan borders. The stakes are high, and the implications of U.S. reentry into Bagram would resonate throughout the region.
If Trump’s administration adopts a pragmatic approach and explores innovative arrangements, it may secure a foothold in Afghanistan without becoming embroiled in another protracted entanglement. Given the current geopolitical landscape, reestablishing access to Bagram could represent a significant foreign-policy victory for the administration and an opportunity worth pursuing.
