As the political landscape shifts under U.S. President Donald Trump’s second term, Taiwan finds itself grappling with mounting pressure from both the United States and China. The Taiwanese government faces a delicate balancing act as Chinese President Xi Jinping reportedly pushes Trump to formally oppose Taiwanese independence, while the White House is urging Taiwan to relocate a significant portion of its semiconductor industry to the U.S. in exchange for protection against Chinese aggression.
In previous months, speculation about potential grand bargains between Trump and Xi had circulated among analysts, but such agreements have yet to materialize. Trump’s track record of honoring deals has been inconsistent, leading to skepticism about whether China would make concessions based on promises that may not hold under future administrations. Recent diplomatic developments have seen Xi gain some traction with Trump, but the prospect of the U.S. actively opposing Taiwan’s independence remains unlikely. While Trump himself appears indifferent to Taiwan’s plight, many Republicans are staunch supporters, and any perceived capitulation to China could provoke significant backlash.
Taiwan’s situation is complicated by a shift in the composition of allies in the U.S. government. The hawks of Trump’s first term, such as Mike Pompeo and Matt Pottinger, have largely been replaced with younger isolationists. U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio, once a strong advocate for Taiwan, seems more focused on securing Trump’s approval than on supporting Taiwan’s interests.
Given these dynamics, Taiwan must consider its options. One potential strategy is to align with Trump’s agenda in the short term, even if it may not lead to beneficial outcomes in the long run. Relocating Taiwan’s semiconductor industry to the U.S. is a highly impractical task, given the heavy reliance on local technologies and supply chains. Additionally, the prospect of Taiwanese workers relocating en masse to the U.S. is slim, particularly after observing the challenges faced by South Korean workers in the U.S.
Taiwan could attempt to buy time by feigning interest in the relocation plan, making token investments in the U.S., and waiting for Trump’s attention to drift toward other priorities. Alternatively, Taiwan might explore ways to “pay off” Trump through political favors or other economic agreements. Recently, Taiwan secured a significant soybean deal with the U.S., which aims to support struggling American farmers but falls short of compensating for the substantial losses incurred from declining Chinese soybean exports.
More pragmatically, Taiwan could leverage its existing relationships with lawmakers on Capitol Hill to advocate for the continued provision of arms and an implicit guarantee of its defense. Bipartisan support remains strong, with figures like Republican Senator Roger Wicker actively endorsing Taiwan’s sovereignty and freedom.
An important avenue for Taiwan is facilitating a meeting between President Lai Ching-te—who is fluent in English and a Harvard graduate—and Trump. Such engagement could help mend relations and ensure Taiwan’s voice is heard in U.S. policy discussions.
Looking ahead, however, if Taiwan continues to perceive the U.S. as an unreliable security partner, it may need to reconsider its defense strategies, including the possibility of reviving its nuclear weapons program, which was abandoned in the 1980s due to U.S. pressure.
As Taiwan navigates these complex geopolitical waters, it must remain vigilant and adaptable, seeking to balance immediate needs with long-term security strategies.
In other developments, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has announced the dates for its Fourth Plenum, scheduled for October 20 to 23. These high-level meetings often cover various topics, including potential personnel changes, although no significant shifts are anticipated this time. Analysts expect the plenum to focus on rebalancing China’s economy and shedding some of the priorities established during Xi’s early tenure.
Additionally, in a significant move, China has agreed to alter its World Trade Organization (WTO) status from “developing” to “developed,” a change long advocated by the U.S. While this shift may enhance China’s relationship with Washington, it also reflects Xi’s domestic agenda of positioning China as a middle-income country. Despite being the world’s second-largest economy, China still ranks near the middle globally in per capita income.
As Taiwan assesses its position amid these evolving circumstances, it must remain proactive in fortifying its international relationships and asserting its sovereignty in the face of external pressures.
