In a move that reflects a broader strategy to project power beyond its borders, the Russian government recently secured control over the Orthodox Church of St. Nicholas and St. Alexandra in Nice, France, following a protracted legal battle. This development marks a significant moment in the ongoing efforts by the Kremlin and the Russian Orthodox Church to reclaim properties that were once part of the Russian Empire, a strategy first initiated in 2010 with the acquisition of St. Nicholas Cathedral, the second largest Orthodox church in Western Europe. Both properties have now been handed over to the Moscow Patriarchate, highlighting the intertwining of religious institutions and state interests in contemporary Russia.
The legal and political maneuvering surrounding these church properties underscores a complex history that stretches back over a century. Following the Bolshevik Revolution, the newly established Soviet government renounced the foreign assets of the Russian Empire, which led to a legal quagmire for Russian church properties abroad. In regions not overtaken by local authorities, émigré communities—often comprising White Russian refugees and opponents of the Bolshevik regime—attempted to maintain control, albeit through legally ambiguous means.
The intricacies of international law regarding property claims for successor states create a convoluted backdrop for these church acquisitions. While Russia today claims to succeed the Soviet Union, it has not formally claimed continuity with the Russian Empire. Nevertheless, in the early 2000s, the Russian government began leveraging imperial-era lease agreements to reclaim church properties, eventually leading to successful lawsuits in French courts. The recent rulings in favor of Russia have significant implications, not only for property rights but also for geopolitical dynamics as Russia asserts itself more aggressively in Europe.
The push to reclaim foreign church properties can be traced back to the late 1990s, when historian Vladlen Sirotkin proposed that recovering “tsar’s gold” abroad could help alleviate Russia’s economic woes. This notion captured the attention of state officials, and by the early 2000s, the Kremlin began earnestly pursuing this agenda. Vladimir Putin, who became president in 2000, recognized the potential of leveraging the Russian Orthodox Church as a tool of soft power, aiming to position Moscow’s patriarch as a leading figure within the global Orthodox Christian community.
Unlike other religious structures, the Orthodox Church lacks a central authority akin to a pope. Instead, it is a federation of independent churches, each governed by its own bishop. Historically, the ecumenical patriarch of Constantinople has been regarded as the first among equals, though this status has fluctuated over time. The decline of Ottoman influence allowed the Moscow Patriarchate to rise, particularly as the only major Orthodox Church not under Ottoman control, positioning it as a pivotal player in Orthodox Christianity.
As the Soviet Union dissolved, there was uncertainty regarding the future of the Russian Orthodox Church. However, Putin’s strategic embrace of the church transformed it into a significant actor in both national and global arenas, enhancing the Moscow patriarch’s influence dramatically.
Putin’s early efforts included reuniting disparate Russian Orthodox congregations abroad, specifically the Russian Orthodox Church Outside of Russia (ROCOR), which had distanced itself from the Moscow Patriarchate due to its perceived alignment with Soviet interests. Over time, the Moscow Patriarchate worked diligently to win over ROCOR leaders, ultimately achieving a reunion in 2007. This merger provided a legal foundation for Moscow to assert claims over pre-revolutionary church properties, particularly in Western Europe.
However, the reconciliation with ROCOR did not extend to those Russian churches that had aligned with Constantinople. The competition between Moscow and Constantinople intensified, particularly with the 2019 declaration of independence for the Orthodox Church of Ukraine, a move that sought to diminish Russian control over religious life in Ukraine.
As tensions have escalated due to Russia’s military actions in Ukraine, the Russian Orthodox Church has increasingly acted as an arm of the Kremlin, issuing blessings for military actions and framing the conflict in ideological terms. This relationship complicates the implications of Russia’s reclamation of church properties in Europe, raising concerns among Western governments about the dual threats posed by these acquisitions: the potential for espionage and the undermining of local communities that have maintained these churches for generations.
In Nice, the local Russian Orthodox community is grappling with the ramifications of this shift. Descendants of White Russians who once thrived in the city find themselves at a crossroads. While some remain steadfast in their commitment to their church, others are seeking refuge in nearby Greek Orthodox congregations. The situation exemplifies the broader struggles faced by communities caught between their cultural heritage and the political machinations of the Russian state.
As the situation evolves, the ramifications of Russia’s aggressive reclamation of ecclesiastical properties will likely resonate beyond France, posing a significant challenge for Western nations in addressing the complex intersection of religious freedom, national security, and geopolitical strategy. The repercussions of these developments underscore the urgent need for dialogue and a reevaluation of international approaches to property rights in the context of historical grievances.
