
By Georgios Chamilakis
Populism is a term that admittedly, is hard to define. Different scholars, define populism differently. Even though the concept may be elusive, and even though it may provoke confusion to the public consciousness and may be shrouded in abstractness, populism can be somewhat delimited. It can be found in politicians with many different ideologies, ideologies that span the entirety of the politico-ideological spectrum, from communism to fascism. Populism is a combination of an illiberal, authoritarian ideology with some democratic traits. Several primary characteristics of populism are: the alleged monopoly of expression of the entire population, the exertion of democratic procedures and practices to appeal and persuade the electorate, and the categorization of an adversary politician, party, or ideology as the ostensible danger to the interests of the people (Finchelstein 2017, 98-174 and Mueller 2016). In addition to that, populism innately supports, but also is supported by the schism between the upper, “elite” classes, and the lower classes. For leaders who choose to engage in populistic practices, there exist only two sides (falling into the trap of False Dilemma Fallacy), there is nothing but a dichotomy: on one side, there is the people, consisting of hard-working, lower to middle class individuals, who can ostensibly be represented only by one singular political leader (the Populist), while on the other side there are political or economic elites, that have conflictual interests with the people (Stanley 2008, 95-110). These elites, the populist would advocate, exercise their (political or economic) power to suppress and exploit the people. As it has been the case though, some of the populist leaders who have risen to power belonged to an “elite” class themselves, like Donald J. Trump and Rodrigo Duterte.
The main tactic that is inherent to populism is the invocation to emotion. Principally, anger, wrath, and resentment, that derive from the wealth and the power of the elites, and which should be targeted back at them, according to the populist leader (Rosenthal 2020, 4). For populism, there cannot be many different voices that represent the different interests of the different people of a society. For populism, there can be only one leader who embodies the will of the majority of the people. Populism, therefore, becomes dangerous, and even incompatible with Democracy in this regard, for Democracy requires a plethora and divergence of opinions and recognizes and accepts that opposing parties (and opposing politicians and ideas) can win and prevail in free and fair elections. And here lies the distinction in the theoretical framework between populism and Democracy or other forms of government: Populism is not a form of government; it is an ideology and a form of political rhetoric. Thus, populism cannot be included in the typology of political systems alongside with Democracy, Fascism, Communism etc.. Politicians use populism as part of their ideology and rhetoric to rise to power, believing that is a compelling way, with convincing tactics, to address to and persuade big parts of the electorate. In other words, while populism is not a form of government or an authoritarian ideology, it is an illiberal ideology, damaging and harmful to Democracy, that can be used as a vehicle for politicians to appeal to voters and mislead them. Populism can become a “regime”, if populists rise to power (Finchelstein 2017, 98), but not in a way that would create a new form of government. Populist leaders simply merge democratic and illiberal (or even authoritarian) practices.
Some of the factors, inter alia, that are attributed with giving rise to far-right populist movements and governments are immigration, the status of the national and global economy (as well as trends in economic growth), class divisions, anti-elitism, even political correctness (Grindheim, 2019, 757). However, the status of the economy and the various economic trends may be a slightly inferior factor (or at least more difficult to study as part of the populistic equation) as initially one would have anticipated, given that popular right-wing (and far right-wing) populist movements have emerged and been successful (not necessarily in clinching elections) in countries such as, Sweden, Finland, Norway, Denmark, and The Netherlands, which have been countries with the “most developed and comprehensive welfare states” in the world (Grindheim 2019, 757). Even in the United States, the world’s biggest economy (in nominal GDP), where relative strong and healthy economic growth has been the almost uninterrupted trend for decades, a populist leader managed to win the Presidency.
Immigration has been cited as the most common reason for the rise of right-wing populist movements. However, it is the rhetoric about immigration, or how immigration is portrayed by populists that has given right-wing Populists a fertile ground to grow and consolidate their power (Dennison and Geddes 2019, 107-116). There seems to be a correlation (not necessarily a causation) between an increased flow of immigrants coming to a country, and an increased awareness of immigration as a political matter, that consequently leads people to favor right-wing (populistic) parties that have harder stances on immigration (or altogether, have xenophobic agendas) (Grindheim 2019, 764). Another reason that explains the upsurge of populist movements is inequality and class divisions. The most famous argument here is probably made by Thomas Piketty. Piketty argues that global inequalities have worsened and deepened since the late 1970s and the 1980s, when neoliberal governments, including and predominantly the ones of Reagan and Thatcher, followed a neoliberal approach in the social welfare state, and believed rigidly and absolutely in globalization and capitalism with minimal interventions. This gave a sharp rise to inequalities, which consequently, were the pretext for populist movements’ rhetoric and agenda (Piketty, 2013 and Grindheim 2019, 765).
Populism should be researched and studied on a case-to-case basis, since not all populists are the same; from far-right to far-left, there are different cases of populists, with different historical contexts for each and every case and different ideologies and characteristics. The origins of populism though can be found at the end of World War II, after the rise of Fascism to power in Italy and its subsequent overthrowing (Finchelstein 2017, 98). For other scholars though, such as the great philosopher Hannah Arendt, the “spirit” of populism emerged even before the end of the Great War, with the rise of the Russian Communist Party to power after the October Revolution. For her, the socialist/communist regime in Soviet Union at the time, as well as Fascism in Italy and National Socialism in Germany were all violent ideologies that managed to rise to power, incorporating populistic characteristics, traits, and rhetoric (Arendt 1976), in a world where populism had not fully been incubated.
Democracy is wounded and weakened on a global scale due to the populism. Poisonous, eroding, harmful and damaging, populism has never destroyed a Republic (Finchelstein 2017, 98), but its impact can be seen and felt in the Democratic institutions that are eroded, in the Democratic practices that are tainted by illiberalism, in the Democratic tradition and culture that seems way less Democratic when immigrants are being targeted, minorities’ rights and human rights are abused, and when disinformation and lies render finding the truth an arduous task.
References
- Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, (New York: HarperColin, 1976)
- Finchelstein, Federico, From Fascism to Populism in History, (Oakland: University of California Press, 2017),
- Grindheim, Why Right-Leaning Populism has Grown in theMost Advanced Liberal Democracies of Europe, The Political Quarterly, Vol. 90, No. 4, October–December 2019
- J. Dennison and A. Geddes,‘A rising tide? The salience of immigration and the rise of anti-im-migration political parties in Western Europe’,The Political Quarterly, vol. 90, no. 1, January–March 2019
- Mueller, Jans-Werner. What is Populism? (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2016
- Piketty,Le Capital au XXIe siecle, Paris, editions du Seuil, 2013
- Rosenthal, Empire of Resentment: Populism’s Toxic Embrace of Nationalism, (New York: The New Press, 2020)
- Stanley, Ben, The Thin Ideology of Populism”. Journal of Political Ideologies (2008)
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