By Nickolaos Angelis
In the wake of the end of the Cold War, when the international system entered a process of reconfiguration and new issues like the growth of ethnonationalism arose, it became obvious that human beings, acting individually or in collectivities, are the source of much behavior and most change in international politics.
The paradigm of classical realism with its ‘rational actor’ model possesses a great explanatory value in focusing on the “bigger picture” of international relations, which is not to be missed. Nevertheless, historical practice indicates that assumptions that presume the states as unitary actors and theoretical concepts such as economic determinism have become obsolete in a complex globalized world that requires to be addressed by more specific explanations and narrowed analysis approaches than by a grand theory. Given that, less tangible elements like ideas and values that affect the policy-makers can leave their imprint on the implementation of the Foreign Policy of great powers and on the international systemic process too.
A vast variety of factors like culture, historical events, geography, economics, ideology, etc., shape the societal context in which the decisionmaker operates. As a result, the importance of the ideological and societal context illustrates the need for a compelling explanation of foreign policy that cannot treat the decider exogenously (Hermann and Kegley, 1995).
Values and ideas are forming the domestic structures of a nation-state and when they are subsequently institutionalized, they can influence foreign policy-making as well. It is also believed, that the strategic culture of a state is deeply correlated with the national characteristics that produce a distinguishable value system. In that sense, the differences between the United States and the USSR on military strategy during the Cold War which was based on American favoring of mutually assured destruction (MAD), and the Soviet adopting of a war-fighting strategy could be explained by the historical and cultural differences that were rooted in these Great Powers. In other words, the choice of embracing a numerically more lethal strategy could be explained by the fact that in the Russian and Soviet value system human life was of less importance contrary to the USA that considered to be a ‘lighthouse of democracy and freedom’. Indeed, in the Battle of Stalingrad, the Red Army used locals who weren’t soldiers, but civilians and who pressed into service and thrown against the Germans to buy time and sometimes to clear landmines with their lives (Beevor, 2012).
Furthermore, this can be seen at a lower level, in the bilateral conflict (but still perilous for regional and global security) between Palestine and Israel. In this endless conflict, Palestinians used suicide bombers over the years for their military and political objectives to the point of glorifying these martyrdom attacks. In an old interview in the New York Times, Arafat’s wife said that if she had a son there would be “no greater honor” than for him to become a suicide bomber (Miller, 2002).
On the other hand, Israelis are more parsimonious when it comes to human life numbers. The Holocaust of Jews in WWII along with numerous ‘common experiences of extermination’ that can be traced back to the Hellenistic years and Roman Empire to the extent that the deaths of Israelis since the October 7 attacks can explain -not to justify – to a certain extent the overactive subsequent military response. There is no space for negligence in the Israeli reality. The political cost is proportionally unbearable in such cases. For instance, Golda Meir was blamed for the severe early losses on Israel’s army (because of not ordering a preemptive strike and not exploiting the intelligence that warned for a surprise attack) after the 1973 Arab-Israeli War even though it ended in an Israeli victory. At the same time, Meir expressed zero tolerance when it came to the terrorist attacks in the Olympics of Munich in 1972. She commanded the operation with the code name ‘Wrath of God’ (Bayonet) to assassinate the individuals that they accused of being involved in the massacre. This covert operation is believed to have taken place worldwide in a period of 20 years and was executed by Caesarea which is the division responsible for special, covert operations, and it houses the elite Kidon (‘Javelin’) unit.
Israel has also given no quarter to the actual perpetrators of the Holocaust no matter how far they were (Adolf Eichmann) or how old they were (John Demjanjuk). Nazis who survived after the Axis downfall were traced down, arrested, and were brought to justice of the State of Israel.
All in all, the values and the ideals as an indispensable part of the Foreign Policy of a Great Power are yet to become obsolete. That is the rule in the case of USA from the Kennan’s ‘X Article’ and Reagan’s ‘Evil Empire’ speech until the current Sino-American competition. Throughout the American history, the threat of authoritarianism over the security and the core values of American nation is what it moves and mobilizes the American people (Friedberg, 2018). As regards the Sino-American relations, the image of Americans as the “vindicators” of liberalism and the human rights provides them with an advantage in this competition. Additionally, USA historically used ideology in a way of instrumentalizing the human rights and the global sense of justice in its favor. Afghani mujahedeens were on the side of the “angels” as Freedom Fighters before they become the opponents in the War on Terror when the Neoconservative belief in the efficacy of unilateral force formed the ideological core of President Bush Jr’s government (Lieberfeld,2005). In this sense, nowadays, Americans do not hesitate to point out the incompatible authoritarianism of China with the American high ideals, when it comes to the genocide of Uyghurs in Xinjiang and the repression of civilians due to COVID-19 crisis in both mainland China and Hong Kong (Brands and Cooper, 2021).
On the other side of spectrum, Chinese foreign policy is characterized by a “strategic patience” which indicates an influence of the Confucian ideas to the domestic structures and the foreign policymaking of China till today. It is useful to note at this point, the views of the former Chinese leader, Den Xiaoping about the issue of Taiwan and proper stance that China should keep towards it. Firstly, in his concept about “one country, two systems“, the importance of mainland China along with the cultural links that invisibly cross Macao and Hong Kong demonstrates the unique leverage of Chinese nationalism. Furthermore, regarding Taiwan, Xiaoping (2001) believed that “the unification of Taiwan with China is a matter that can wait. And that if that cannot be accomplished in 100 years, it will be in 1,000 years”. From the American perspective where the elected President and his cabinet usually have a horizon of governance of hardly 4 years, this Chinese time frame is totally unthinkable. Dealing with that reality, Americans demonstrated a “strategic ambiguity” which now tends to be questioned (Kuo, 2023). Lastly, it is of high importance to note the conclusions of J. Nye, a widely famous academic and former member of National Intelligence Council of US (NIC). According to the ‘father of soft power theory’, a successful foreign policy approach regarding China should be based, inter alia, on the “preserving of democratic institutions that create soft power that in turn attracts rather than coerces allies” and on “maintaining openness to the world rather than retreating behind a curtain of fear and declinism” (Nye Jr, 2022, p. 1650).
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